

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

74-0410

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Polygraph Study

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Director of Security

DATE

6 FEB 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. EO/DDA
7D-24 Headquarters

7 FEB 1984

7 Feb

2.

3. ADDA
7D-24 Headquarters

4.

5. DDA
7D-24 Headquarters

8 FEB 1984

6.

7. D/Security

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Attached is a recently produced study by the Personnel Security Subcommittee of the DCI Security Committee.

It is a collection of anecdotal reports on the utility of the polygraph. The study was launched some months ago by SECOM in anticipation that considerable Congressional attention on polygraph looms up ahead. Because at this late date laboratory studies of polygraph reliability or validity would be impossible to mount, the decision was made to focus on polygraph's main strength anyway: its incredible utility, i.e., its ability to serve as a useful tool in the context of a total security program.

I personally think this piece would be extraordinarily valuable to anyone who goes to Capitol Hill on polygraph testimony in the foreseeable future.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

PERSONNEL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

PerSSub-002-84

2 FEB 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

Chairman, PerSSub

25X1

SUBJECT:

Polygraph Study

25X1

Forwarded herewith is PerSSub-001-84, same Subject, in response to your tasking contained in SECOM-D-172, dated 11 August 1982. It represents the final report on the matter.

25X1

Contributions to the study were received from CIA, FBI, NSA, the Departments of Air Force, Army, Navy and State. The remaining member organizations do not employ the polygraph in their security programs.

25X1

The PerSSub made every effort to provide this report to you in a timely fashion, realizing that it will be of use to Intelligence Community representatives testifying before congressional committees in the near future. The anecdotes were prepared for presentation in an unclassified forum, and in such a manner that neither the subjects nor the contributors could be identified. I anticipate that the DCI will agree to their release in their present form.

25X1

The contributing organizations and their polygraph divisions were all most cooperative throughout this effort. Special recognition is in order for the CIA and NSA members and will be forthcoming.

25X1

25X1

Chairman, PerSSub

Attachment:

PerSSub memorandum 001-84 w/att.

SECRET

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

Serial: PerSSub-001-84

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

2 FEB 1984

FROM: Chairman, PerSSub

SUBJECT: Polygraph Study

25X1

25X1

In accordance with your tasking contained in SECOM-D-172, dated 11 August 1982, the PerSSub undertook a survey designed to establish the utility of the polygraph as a security device within the Intelligence Community. This report represents the results of that effort.

25X1

The survey makes no pretense of objectivity. It was designed to demonstrate that the polygraph is useful in eliciting admissions which would not otherwise be forthcoming by other investigative means. The survey did not address the scientific validity of the process, its scientific reliability or the effect the quality of the examiner's training may have on results. Its utility in bringing out previously unattained information was the only concern.

25X1

The survey was limited in scope to the period dating from January 1980 to September 1983, with a few cases drawn from earlier years. By essentially limiting coverage to this short timeframe, the survey therefore represents but a sampling of a larger body of evidence which supports the utility of the polygraph.

25X1

All agencies of the Intelligence Community utilizing the polygraph contributed. The identities of the contributing entities have been masked through a unique numbering system, the key to which is retained by Chairman, PerSSub. Any inquiries arising regarding a particular case will be referred by Chairman, PerSSub to the proper contributor who will respond in keeping with the policies of the agency involved.

25X1

The 51 selected cases are reported in anecdotal style, contain only the salient facts and are intended to be presentable in an unclassified forum. The issues run the gamut from Espionage to Security Violations. Because this is an Intelligence Community survey, however, numerous criminal cases from those Intelligence Community agencies having a law-enforcement function as well were specifically excluded. In each case, the use of almost-identical wording is intentional to help preserve the anonymity of the contributor.

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

Serial: PerSSub-001-84

[] The sole conclusion drawn from this effort is that there exists an ample body of evidence to prove that the polygraph brings out critical information otherwise denied. The exemplars are but a fraction of material available to support the utility of the polygraph. Our contention is not that the polygraph is perfect but that it is so successful as to justify its retention in our inventory of investigative tools. Its use, or threat of its use, was sufficient to deter Christopher John Boyce from seeking a position at a super-sensitive installation, and David Henry Barnett from attempting reinstatement with CIA. In Great Britain, the Russian spy, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, also conceded that the polygraph would have deterred him from joining GCHQ or would have exposed him while there. Again, how many others have been deterred by threat of polygraph is a matter for frightening speculation.

25X1

[] The PerSSub does not endorse the polygraph as a panacea for all security ills. The polygraph is not considered in isolation, and is always used in conjunction with other investigative tools. Recognizing its limitations and applying it judiciously, the polygraph is essential in obtaining otherwise unattainable information.

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[] The following 51 anecdotal summaries clearly support the premise that the polygraph is a valuable and useful tool in the security programs of the Intelligence Community.

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[]
Chairman
Personnel Security Subcommittee

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Attachment:

As stated above (summaries)

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